Transportation

Protection of free interstate travel and trade represented a central goal of the Constitution. Which of the following state laws do you think the court should have permitted:

1. A state law regulating the number of cars on a freight train;
2. A state law regulating the width of trucks;
3. A state law specifying the type of headlights displayed on trains;
4. A state law regulating the length of trucks, or the number of trailers;
5. Tolls imposed upon trucks carrying freight in interstate commerce;
6. A state law requiring a minimum number in a train crew.

Does it make a difference if the state regulation focuses upon local conditions. The speed limit applicable to a train or truck should be different in Pennsylvania and Nebraska. Should the Court grant greater regulatory leeway if the State can show that it is addressing local conditions. In Southern Pacific Co v Arizona (1945), the Supreme Court struck down an Arizona law limiting the length of trains in Arizona to 70 freight cars. The Court stated:

• ...reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing claims of state and national interests involved. For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such cases, where congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests.

• In considering the effect of the statute as a safety measure, the decisive question is whether in the circumstances the total effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede...

In Bibb v Navaho Freight Lines(1959) the Court invalidated an Illinois law that required contour rear fender mudguards on all trucks and trailers on Illinois highways, thus forcing trucks passing through Illinois not to use mudflaps lawful in 45 states:

• This is one of those cases--few in number--where local safety measures that are nondiscriminatory place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce...We deal not with absolutes but with questions of degree. The state legislatures plainly have great leeway in providing safety regulations for all vehicles--interstate as well as local.

Another example which engendered great controversy was the use of double-trailer trucks. The trucks were perceived by many to constitute a menace on the highways. Some states had not engineered their highways to accommodate the vehicles, it was argued. In the absence of federal action, who should decide whether they were sufficiently safe to traverse the highways: a District Court, the Supreme Court, or local legislatures. In KASSEL v. CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORP., 450 U.S. 662 (1981), the Supreme Court struck down an Iowa statute barring these trailers. The case is interesting, in part, because the decision rests upon a District Court Judge's findings that the Iowa legislature erred in concluding that these trucks presented a safety risk. In affirming the District Court's action, the Supreme Court noted that Indeed, "if safety justifications are not illusory, the Court will not second-guess legislative judgment about their importance in comparison with related burdens on interstate commerce." But something more than legislative findings were required:

• But the incantation of a purpose to promote the public health or safety does not insulate a state law from Commerce Clause attack. Regulations designed for that salutary purpose nevertheless may further the purpose so marginally, and interfere with commerce so substantially, as to be invalid under the Commerce Clause. In the Court's recent unanimous decision in Raymond, we declined to "accept the State's contention that the inquiry under the Commerce Clause is ended without a weighing of the asserted safety purpose against the degree of interference with interstate commerce." 434 U.S., at 443 . This "weighing" by a court requires - and indeed the constitutionality of the state regulation depends on - "a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the course of interstate commerce." Id., at 441; accord, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Bibb, supra, at 525-530; Southern Pacific, supra, at 770.

In defending its safety law, Iowa pointed to three ways in which the 55-foot single is superior: singles take less time to be passed and to clear intersections; they may back up for longer distances; and they are somewhat less likely to jackknife. The Court rejected these factors as insufficient in light of the law's burden on interstate commerce. For this reason, the Court declined to defer to Iowa's safety judgments:

• The Court normally does accord "special deference" to state highway safety regulations. Raymond, 434 U.S., at 444 , n. 18. This traditional deference "derives in part from the assumption that where such regulations do not discriminate on their face against interstate commerce, their burden usually falls on local economic interests as well as other States' economic interests, thus insuring that a State's own political processes will serve as a check against unduly burdensome regulations." Ibid. Less deference to the legislative judgment is due, however, where the local regulation bears disproportionately on out-of-state residents and businesses. Such a disproportionate burden is apparent here. Iowa's scheme, although generally banning large doubles from the State, nevertheless has several exemptions that secure to Iowans many of the benefits of large trucks while shunting to neighboring States many of the costs associated with their use.

The dissent of the Justice Renquist responded that the Court had failed to accord appropriate deference. Instead of deferring to the legislature, it had deferred to a federal district court judge:

• The District Court approached the case as if the question were whether Consolidated's 65-foot trucks were as safe as others permitted on Iowa highways, and the Court of Appeals as if its task were to determine if the District Court's factual findings in this regard were "clearly erroneous." 612 F.2d, at 1069. The question, however, is whether the Iowa Legislature has acted rationally in regulating vehicle lengths and whether the safety benefits from this regulation are more than slight or problematical. "The classification of the traffic for the purposes of regulation . . . is a legislative, not a judicial, function. Its merits are not to be weighed in the judicial balance and the classification rejected merely because the weight of the evidence in court appears to favor a different standard." Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 594 (1939). "Since the adoption of one weight or width regulation, rather than another, is a legislative and not a judicial choice, its constitutionality is not to be determined by weighing in the judicial scales the merits of the legislative choice and rejecting it if the weight of evidence presented in court appears to favor a different standard." Barnwell Brothers, 303 U.S., at 191.

If this approach were followed, it would be difficult to find any defensible maximum truck length which could stand up if some state allowed marginal increases in length:

• The result in this case suggests, to paraphrase Justice Jackson, that the only state truck-length limit "that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on." Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (dissenting opinion). Although the plurality opinion and the opinion concurring in the judgment strike down Iowa's law by different routes, I believe the analysis in both opinions oversteps our "limited authority to review state legislation under the commerce clause," Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 393 U.S. 129, 136 (1968), and seriously intrudes upon the fundamental right of the States to pass laws to secure the safety of their citizens.

Justice Renquist's dissent articulates some troubling difficulties with the Court's approach. How did other states arrive at the longer truck length? Was their decision not somewhat arbitrary. Suppose a state allows an even longer truck length? The incremental change might have a small incremental safety impact, but as compared to the impact on commerce, it would be insufficient to defer to local regulation.

Following this decision, Congress acted comprehensively to resolve pre-emption disputes of this kind through a national safety panel.

Fees and Tolls. The Court has allowed states to impose tolls and fees upon interstate motor carriers, and has allowed a variety of different collection and calculation methods. However, the fee imposed must have some rational relationship to operation of the highways.