Standing

The Court wants the plaintiff to have a real personal interest in the case or controversy. What injury must the plaintiff show, in order to have "standing" to sue? Must the interest be an economic loss; can a taxpayer sue to challenge possible loss to the public treasury; may a Congressman sue to stop enforcement of an unconstitutional law; may an organization challenge a law that interferes with the goals of the organization; may an organization sue on behalf of its members, some of whom are injured by the law. May a company sue the government because a law confers an unfair advantage on its competitors. These are the kinds of issues raised under the concept of "standing."

Standing has two related aspects, constitutional and statutory. The Court itself supervises the constitutional aspect of standing, determining whether a case is ready to be a case under constitutional standards. In addition, many statutes, including the Administrative Procedure Act, seek to regulate when parties have a right to sue. Thus, some of the cases focus upon whether a statute confers standing on a particular party. For example, in Sierra Club v Morton,(1972) the Court deferred to a statute which, the court found, conferred standing upon groups like the Sierra Club, by recognizing its interest in environmental protection.

Taxpayers

State and federal laws provide taxpayers some form of review of their own taxes. A taxpayer clearly has standing to litigate about his own tax bill. The standing issue arises when a taxpayer seeks to challenge some governmental practice, not because the government action targets him, but rather because the taxpayer is Under the law of many states, taxpayers have standing to challenge illegal expenditures of state or local funds. But the federal courts have viewed taxpayer standing quite differently.

Frothingham v Mellon In Frothingham v Mellon, (1923) a taxpayer challenged a statute which apportioned federal appropriations among the states. The Court rejected this taxpayer suit holding that a taxpayer has no standing to challenge a federal law if he merely alleges an injury no different to that of other taxpayers. The Court stated that the individual taxpayer's injury was too small, and that he lacked a sufficient individualized interest in the controversy.

Flast v Cohen In Flast v Cohen, (1968) taxpayers challenged federal expenditures for parochial schools, claiming violation of the first amendment's establishment clause. The Court noted that under Baker v Carr, the gist of the question of standing is whether:

• the party seeking relief has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

In ruling on standing, the Court then should look at the substantive issues:

• to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated to assure that the litigant is a proper and appropriate party to invoke federal judicial power so as to satisfy Article III requirements.

A taxpayer should thus make the following showing, to satisfy these requirements:

1. The taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status (as taxpayer) and the type of legislative enactment attacked. In other words, the taxpayer's claim should focus on an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing and spending clause. A taxpayer cannot challenge executive action merely because it involves spending.

1. The taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status (as taxpayer) and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. In other words, the taxpayer must show that the enactment violates a constitutional limitation relating to spending and taxing.

In Frothingham,the Court held, the taxpayer had challenged a federal spending program, so that the first test had been satisfied. But the basis of her challenge was merely that the Congress had exceeded its general powers, invading provinces reserved to the states. She didn't have a "spending power" case. But in Flast, the Court held, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does "specifically limit the taxing and spending power...."

Do you find these distinction helpful or sensible?